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1 State and Local Incentive 
Competition for New Investment
Over the past decade and a half, "economic development" has 
become entrenched as an important function of state and city govern 
ment. Unlike much of the other, more hidden, work undertaken by 
states and cities, the special economic development deals offered by 
local officials to lure new investment are often covered prominently in 
the press. Few have been unimpressed by the $250 million Alabama 
reputedly gave Mercedes-Benz or by the estimated $130 million South 
Carolina gave BMW (Council of State Governments 1994, p. 12). Pos 
sibly as a result of such eye-grabbing deals, it has become common 
place, not only in the press but among policymakers and academics, to 
characterize the current level of economic development effort as too 
highly competitive and probably detrimental to sound fiscal policy. 
State and local competition for new industrial investment has been 
widely criticized for being a zero-sum, or worse, a negative-sum 
game in other words, providing no national benefits and for being 
potentially harmful to economic growth because it reduces the ability 
of state and local governments to finance investments in education and 
infrastructure. Indeed the subtext of much popular reporting and even 
academic discussion is that states and cities have become imprudently 
generous to private investment while cutting back on more typical gov 
ernmental activities. It is unsurprising then that some prominent 
researchers have called for the federal government to severely limit 
state and local economic development efforts (Burstein and Rolnick 
1996; Rolnick and Burstein 1996; Schweke, Rist, and Dabson 1994) or 
for a major reorientation of the state and local economic development 
effort (LeRoy 1994; Smith and Fox 1990).
Notwithstanding the existence of both this sort of criticism of eco 
nomic development policy and a number of academic and policy jour 
nals dedicated to the issue of state and local economic development 
policy, very little is known about the size of the economic development 
effort. We have some idea of the staff size at state development agen 
cies and of the budgets of those agencies (although for reasons that will
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become clear, it is most unlikely that these budget numbers say much 
about the size of the state economic development effort), and we have 
some knowledge of what economic development instruments states are 
able to use (although there are important discrepancies among the vari 
ous directories of state instruments). However, there is virtually no reli 
able information on the really important questions: How much are 
states willing to provide to a firm? What are state incentives actually 
worth to a firm? What sort of places offer the biggest incentives? At the 
city level, the situation is that much worse; here there is not even a reli 
able directory of instruments or budgets. One result is that public and 
even academic debate on economic development issues is often seri 
ously flawed.
Possibly two of the most crucial issues for economic development 
concern are 1) measuring the worth to the firm of incentives offered 
and 2) identifying the spatial pattern of incentives (in other words, 
determining which communities offer the largest and smallest incen 
tives). These issues are important because almost all economic devel 
opment policy is based on the idea emanating from modern location 
theory that the purpose of incentives is to influence business location 
decisions by improving the relative profitability of investing at a partic 
ular site (Blair and Premus 1987; Chapman and Walker 1990). Unfor 
tunately, the academic and policy literature on economic development 
has tended to focus on other issues, usually the cost of incentive pro 
grams to government or the nominal size of incentive deals. The Ala 
bama incentive package to Mercedes-Benz was reported by one source 
to be composed of $112 million in infrastructure improvements, $30 
million to build a training facility, $60 million for training, $8.7 million 
for tax abatements on machinery and construction materials, and $39 
million in other incentives (Council of State Governments 1994, p. 12). 
What is unclear is the extent to which Mercedes-Benz benefits from 
each dollar of public money spent. Is Mercedes-Benz able to capture 
the full $30 million in state funds spent on the training facility or the 
$112 million spent on infrastructure? These problems are even more 
stark in the BMW deal. Fifty million dollars of BMW©s $130 million 
package was for expansion of the Greenville-Spartanburg airport. It 
seems unreasonable to assume that BMW will be able to capture all of 
the benefits of airport expansion; airports are public facilities, and it is 
much more likely that many (if not most) of the airport©s improvements
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will be captured by other individual and corporate business users, not 
BMW. Much of the economic development literature ignores this prob 
lem.
More generally, the literature has mostly failed to distinguish 
between the nominal value of incentive awards and their actual value to 
the firm. For instance, the 1980s saw considerable Japanese auto plant 
investment in the United States. In a widely quoted article looking at 
this issue, Milward and Newman (1989) claimed that Mazda had 
received state incentives worth around $15,000 per employee for its 
investment in Flat Rock, Michigan. This figure included $19 million in 
worker training, $5 million in road improvements, $3 million in on- 
site railroad improvements, $21 million in an economic development 
loan to be recaptured, and $5 million in water system improvements. 
This gives a total of $53 million for what was then projected to be 
3,500 employees at the new plant. In the same article, various other 
Japanese auto manufacturers were reported to be receiving vast incen 
tive deals. Similar claims about the nominal value of economic devel 
opment deals are commonly made in the press and in the academic and 
policy literature. However, there are problems with such measures 
beyond the matter of a firm©s ability to capture directly the benefits of 
an incentive. Consider the case of Mazda just cited. The costs and ben 
efits associated with various types of economic development incentives 
vary greatly; adding up nominal awards across different programs has 
the effect of comparing apples with oranges. Most obviously, a $1 mil 
lion capital on-site railroad improvement award is likely to be much 
more costly for government, and much more beneficial to the recipient 
firm, than a $1 million capital loan. In the Mazda case, consider the 
$19 million worker training award. If this award provides workers with 
general and transferable skills, then it is unlikely that it was worth the 
full $19 million to Mazda, but if the training were highly customized to 
Mazda©s special needs, then it may indeed have replaced $19 million in 
expenses that Mazda would otherwise have incurred.
So, the question remains, How should the worth of incentives be 
measured? The first concern of this book is to measure, from the point 
of view of the firm, the true benefits of state and city incentives. A 
cogent answer to this question is a prerequisite to any sensible debate 
on the impact of incentives on a firm©s investment decisions. Moreover, 
an answer also allows us to begin to provide innovative and useful
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responses to a related issue that has dogged the economic development 
literature: can development incentives reasonably be expected to influ 
ence a firm©s location decisions? In all of this, our purpose is not to add 
to the already extensive econometric and survey literature on whether 
economic development incentives measurably affect the location deci 
sions of firms. While our results do complement this research, our pur 
pose is limited to measuring the worth of incentives to the firm.
Unfortunately, providing a comprehensive and cogent measurement 
of the worth of economic development incentives to firms is a daunt- 
ingly complex task. A vast proportion of the work going into the 
answers provided in this book is methodological. As a result, much of 
the book is itself devoted to methodology (although more technical dis 
cussions are segregated into Chapter 3 and Appendixes B and C and 
may be avoided by readers not interested in such issues). Simply put, 
the answers we give in this book derive from the output of a very large 
computer simulation model (the Tax and Incentive Model, or TAIM). It 
has been our experience that the answers provided by TAIM and 
equally by competing models are often crucially dependent on the 
assumptions incorporated into the model. Understanding the assump 
tions is an important part of understanding the answers themselves. 
One of the criticisms we have of some although certainly not all of 
the work done in the same tradition as ours (researchers using the 
hypothetical firm method) is that public policy conclusions are made 
on the basis of data and assumptions the underpinnings of which are 
inadequately discussed.
The second concern we focus on is the spatial pattern of economic 
development incentives. In particular, do poorer, more distressed 
places tend to offer bigger incentives than wealthier, less distressed 
places? We believe this matter has received insufficient attention in the 
literature. An answer to this question is crucial; if competitive state and 
local economic development policy is to provide net benefits for the 
nation, then it should, we believe, tend to promote the redistribution of 
employment from areas of low economic distress. 1 For this to occur, 
economic development efforts should be concentrated or more active 
in poorer, economically troubled places.
Although our research concentrates on these two issues the worth 
and spatial pattern of incentives our results also shed light on a set of 
related, secondary questions:
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  Would it be feasible for the federal government to limit the state 
and local economic development effort?
  What is the role of enterprise zones in delivering incentives to 
firms?
  What proportion of the total incentive package is a tax-based enti 
tlement and what proportion derives from non-tax awards (such 
as grants, loans, and loan guarantees)?
Here we focus on taxes and incentives across the 24 most important 
industrial states and a sample of 112 cities within those states. We mea 
sure the value of incentives available in these states and municipalities 
from the standpoint of a business. 2 That is, we assess the after-tax 
income effects of state and local tax and incentive regimes. This 
enables us to explore the size and redistributional impacts of state and 
local incentive programs in considerable detail.
THE EXPANSION OF AND JUSTIFICATION 
FOR STATE AND LOCAL INCENTIVES
Although states were subsidizing private industry with public 
money over a century and a half ago, and although explicit "smoke 
stack chasing" began nearly 60 years ago with Mississippi©s "Balance 
Agriculture with Industry" program, it is only over the past two 
decades that there has been explosive growth in state and local eco 
nomic development activity (McCraw 1986; Netzer 1991). Many, if 
not the majority of, state-level economic development agencies were 
established during this period, and although no accurate historical cen 
sus of municipal economic development agencies exists, it is likely that 
the majority of local economic development departments were either 
established or greatly increased over the past 20 years (Eisinger 1988, 
pp. 16-17). So too, the instruments of economic development have 
expanded rapidly, and the use made of any single instrument has inten 
sified. Eisinger (1988), using data from the annual survey of economic 
development incentives by Site Selection and Industrial Development 
(and the magazine©s precursors), developed a measure of state-level 
policy penetration that assesses the use by states of economic develop-
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ment instruments available at a particular time period. He found that 
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s there were large increases both in 
the variety of instruments available to state officials and in the use 
made of any particular instrument. Eisinger (1995) claims that there is 
some evidence of a slowdown in the economic development effort dur 
ing the early 1990s, and data from the Council of State Governments 
suggest that this is indeed the case (Council of State Governments 
1994, pp. 4-6). What limited information we have on the expenditures 
of state and local economic development agencies suggests a substan 
tial increase in spending during the 1980s (Fisher 1990) but some 
"state fiscal crisis-induced" cutbacks during the early 1990s (Brad- 
shaw, Nishikawa, and Blakely 1992). State appropriations for state 
economic development agencies rose from $255 million in 1982 to 
$999 million in 1988 (National Association of State Development 
Agencies 1988) but declined somewhat in the early 1990s (although 
these figures are far from being unambiguous indicators of the devel 
opment effort). The net result is that both relocating and new plants in 
the United States now appear to regularly receive incentive packages 
consisting of various combinations of federal, state, and locally 
financed subsidies. These can include a mix of property tax abate 
ments, sundry tax credits and exemptions for such things as investment 
in plant and machinery or research and development, job training cred 
its and wage subsidies, road and other infrastructure improvement 
incentives, and various sorts of capital grants, loans, and loan guar 
antees.
The usual justification for these types of incentives is that they are 
necessary for the local expansion of employment opportunities, given 
the competitive investment environment in which states and municipal 
ities currently exist. In other words, a locality usually finds itself com 
peting for new private investment with other similarly endowed 
localities; in order to "capture" a relocating firm, the locality must 
ensure that it offers, other things being equal, the "least cost" site. This 
understanding of the role of economic development policy is based 
explicitly on traditional industrial location theory. Here, firms are held 
to be profit maximizers that evaluate alternative business sites based on 
product demand and the costs of production at various sites 
(Wasylenko 1981). Localities having high product demand (or at least 
good and cheap access to areas of high demand) and low costs for pri-
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mary inputs (such as wages, land, energy, and capital) and processing 
costs (such as taxes and general regulations) will be most attractive to 
firms. From the viewpoint of city or state government, the argument in 
favor of economic development incentives is that they might be able to 
reduce the cost structure of a potential plant just enough to induce relo 
cation from the maximum-profit site to the incentive-offering site 
(Blair and Premus 1987; Chapman and Walker 1990). Although the 
range of incentive instruments is extraordinarily diverse, "all focus on 
reducing the costs of doing business" at a particular site (Gerking and 
Morgan 1991, p. 34). 3
This raises a more basic question: Why should states and localities 
want to use scarce revenues to encourage new industrial investment? 
The political justification is almost always that, since states and munic 
ipalities are part of a competitive interjurisdictional locality market, 
incentives are necessary to lure new investment and the jobs (for resi 
dents of the state or municipality) and the taxes resulting from that 
investment. Consequently, incentive programs are usually judged in 
the popular media, by politicians, and very often by development offi 
cials on their ability to retain or generate new employment. The cen 
tral financial justification is that new investment, and its resultant 
direct, indirect, and induced jobs and spending, will help maintain or 
expand the state or local government©s revenue base and presumably 
improve the government©s ability to provide its residents with services 
(or reduce the per-capita costs of providing the current level of ser 
vices). The principal economic justification is that the new investment 
and its associated multiplier will enhance the income of the locality©s 
residents.4
CRITICISMS OF INCENTIVE COMPETITION
A number of criticisms have been leveled at incentive competition. 
Some individuals have worried about the effects on the ability of state 
and local government to provide services. Without proper analysis and 
administration, incentives may become overly generous, resulting in a 
net drain on a local government©s revenue base. Incentive competition 
could, in fact, divert resources from state and local programs, such as
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investments in education, that in the long run are important contribu 
tors to economic growth, locally and nationally. As a corollary of this 
argument that the net fiscal impact of incentives could be negative, 
some have noted that the economic growth sought by development 
officials can in the long run raise the costs of providing municipal ser 
vices. There is evidence that larger city size is associated with higher 
per-capita costs of supplying city services to residents (Muller 1975, 
pp. 3-19; Ladd and Yinger 1991, pp. 83-85). Thus, leaving aside the 
issue of the direct costs and benefits of an incentive regime itself, 
incentive-induced development may result in fewer or more costly 
public services for a locality©s residents.
Others have argued that, without a commitment to the long-term 
management of incentives, job creation may never materialize or may 
materialize only at the expense of job loss elsewhere in the state, 
municipality, or metropolitan area. Indeed, the professional economic 
development literature is littered with stories in which incentives did 
not produce the requisite revenue or job benefits (Glickman and Wood 
ward 1989; Guskind 1990; Hovey 1986). Related to these issues is a 
much broader concern that states and municipalities often provide 
incentive packages based more on politics and perceptions than on a 
formal consideration of either the local costs and benefits or of the 
optimal size of the incentive package necessary to induce relocation. 
Certainly, this has been a constant theme in the coverage by the popu 
lar press of the various deals for foreign auto manufacturers. Neverthe 
less, the focus of scholarly criticism has not been on these practical 
issues of program administration but on the economic justification for 
development incentives. Indeed, criticisms of the economic justifica 
tion raise fundamental questions about the merit of locational subsi 
dies.
Since American labor is highly mobile over 13 percent of the met 
ropolitan population moves across metropolitan areas in any given 
four-year period some economists have argued that, at least in the 
long run, labor will tend to move from areas of high unemployment to 
areas of low unemployment (Marston 1985). 5 Job-creating incentives 
in a single locality are therefore unnecessary and probably 
counterproductive. Without the incentives, unemployed or underem 
ployed workers in a locality would eventually find jobs elsewhere. If 
government were genuinely concerned with the welfare of its citizens,
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it would more logically spend revenues not on locational incentives to 
encourage investment, but on increasing the mobility of the unem 
ployed so that these individuals would benefit from the work opportu 
nities in more vigorous labor markets elsewhere.
Moreover, if workers are mobile, using incentives to create jobs in 
one location merely provides inducement for job-seekers from else 
where to move into that location (Logan and Molotch 1987). Thus, the 
original unemployed inhabitants of that locality may benefit very little, 
if at all, from incentive-induced new investments. By extension, in the 
long run, such investment may have little or no positive effect on the 
locality©s unemployment or labor force participation rates. This sort of 
argument has led others to claim that while the public rhetoric of 
incentives is always couched in language focusing on the job gains for 
unemployed and underemployed locals, the true beneficiaries of incen 
tive-induced growth are not local job-seekers but the owners of that 
immobile and scarce resource, land (Logan and Molotch 1987). There 
fore, economic development policy is likely to have a regressive 
impact on the local distribution of income.
Rubin and Zorn (1985) have argued that, because state and local 
programs tend to be competitive and therefore merely encourage the 
movement of employment opportunities from one place to another but 
do not actually result in net national job creation, the overall benefits to 
the nation of state and local incentive programs are close to nil. Incen 
tives merely result in the spatial reshuffling of investment, which 
would, sans incentives, have occurred somewhere anyway. Borrowing 
a term from game theory, a number of critics have characterized state 
and local incentive competition as essentially a zero-sum game. 6
Insofar as the incentive-induced reshuffling of investment results in 
a spatial pattern less efficient than the pattern would have been without 
such incentives, it is plausible to argue that state and local incentives 
produce net economic welfare losses for the national economy and 
thus may more usefully be characterized as negative-sum. 7 The conten 
tion here is that incentive competition induces firms to choose loca 
tions based on their tax consequences rather than on the basis of real 
resource cost differentials (such as the price and productivity of land 
and labor, transportation costs, and so on). Taken together, these criti 
cisms present a damning picture of economic development practice in
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the United States. However, there is reason to believe that many of the 
criticisms are misplaced.
WHY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 
MAY BE USEFUL: REVISIONIST RESEARCH
There is an expanding body of research suggesting that the preced 
ing arguments against the use of incentives are misplaced. For 
instance, there is evidence that some groups of people, especially older, 
less-skilled, or minority workers, are relatively nonmobile, and that 
even for skilled, younger, or nonminority workers, spatial mobility is 
quite limited in the short run. Moreover, a number of economists have 
argued that interjurisdictional competition for investment may be 1) 
economically efficient, 2) have a much smaller negative impact than 
has been claimed, or 3) have effects not nearly as strong as assumed in 
the literature. Given some assumptions about the nature of competition 
among localities, 8 Gates and Schwab (1991) contend that, in equilib 
rium, business taxes become true benefits taxes in that they equal the 
value businesses place on the government services they receive. In 
these circumstances, interjurisdictional competition fosters economic 
efficiency. Netzer, while disagreeing with Gates and Schwab about the 
efficiency of local taxes, nevertheless argues that incentive competition 
does not have the negative impacts claimed by its critics: "If markets 
are not functioning perfectly, economic development policy instru 
ments that offset the imperfections can move toward, rather than away 
from, efficiency in resource allocation" (Netzer 1991, p. 230). Thus,
economic development incentives are ... neither very good nor 
very bad from the standpoint of efficient resource allocation in the 
economy. With all the imperfections, the offering of incentives 
does not represent a fall from grace, but neither does competition 
in this form operate in ways that truly parallel the efficiency-creat 
ing operations of private competitive markets. Given the low cost- 
effectiveness of most instruments, there is little national impact, 
only a waste of local resources in most instances. (Netzer 1991, 
pp. 239-240)
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Netzer also maintains that the supposed zero-sum nature of Ameri 
can economic development policy rests on an implausible assumption: 
that the American economy is closed. Although the proportion of for 
eign direct investment (FDI) in the United States (measured as a share 
of total employment or assets) is still much smaller than in a number of 
European countries, foreign investment has become an increasingly 
important part of the American economy, and states and localities very 
often target their incentives to encourage FDI (Glickman and Wood 
ward 1989). In fact, a large number of American states have overseas 
offices chartered specifically to encourage such investment (Archer and 
Maser 1989; Kudrle and Kite 1989). Thus, incentives do not merely 
move a set number of jobs around the United States; they may also 
serve to encourage new investment from abroad. Other critics have 
shown that the level of interjurisdictional competition is much more 
limited than had previously been thought (Hanson 1993). Indeed, Han- 
son argues that there is inertia in the economic development efforts of 
states and cities; for example, the best predictor of what a locality will 
offer this year is what it offered last year.
Insofar as state and local economic development programs are con 
cerned, some of the most interesting recent empirical work has sug 
gested that incentives might be beneficial both to localities and to the 
nation. Bartik (1991b) claims that incentive-induced employment 
growth might have advantageous long-term effects on a locality©s labor 
force participation and unemployment rates. Moreover, incentive com 
petition may have significant benefits from the national perspective. 9
Bartik©s argument, backed by various empirical results, is that 
incentive-induced employment growth in a locality©s labor market may 
be long-term, progressive, and salutary. Employment growth in a met 
ropolitan area will lead to a permanent drop in the area©s unemploy 
ment rate and to an increase in its labor force participation rate. In 
percentage terms, the real earnings effects of incentive-induced job 
growth are greater for black and less-educated workers than for white 
or more educated workers, and greater for lower-earning males than for 
higher-earning males (Bartik 1991b, pp. 184-185). As a result, the 
impact of employment growth on income distribution may be modestly 
progressive. Based on these results and on a speculative benefit-cost 
analysis, Bartik goes on to make two major claims:
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  In places of high unemployment, economic development incen 
tives are more likely to be cost-effective.
  From the national standpoint, to the extent that incentives are 
concentrated in places of high unemployment, economic devel 
opment policy may tend to be positive-sum.
Translated crudely, economic development policy is likely, all else 
being equal, to be more beneficial if pursued more vigorously by 
poorer places and to be less so if pursued more vigorously by wealthier 
places. The reason for both of Bartik©s claims is that the wage level 
necessary to induce movement of unemployed individuals into jobs 
(the reservation wage) is likely to be lower in high-unemployment 
areas than in low-unemployment areas. Thus, the true benefits of 
employment the wage offer made to the individual minus his or her 
reservation wage are greater from a benefit-cost viewpoint in loca 
tions with high unemployment than in those with low unemployment. 
To the extent that areas with a low reservation wage are net investment 
recipients, reshuffling of jobs may produce net national benefits. These 
findings and claims clearly challenge much of the traditional scholarly 
wisdom about the local and national impact of spatially competitive 
economic development incentives, and they set the stage for the argu 
ment of this monograph.
Bartik©s positive scenario rests on three critical and logically 
sequential arguments:
  Economic development incentives probably can influence firm 
location and expansion decisions and thus can result in shocks 
(sudden growth) to local labor demand.
  Reservation wages are indeed higher in low-unemployment areas 
and lower in high-unemployment areas.
  The pattern of incentives at the state and local level tends to result 
in the relocation of investment from areas of low unemployment 
to areas of high unemployment.
Most of the rest of this book focuses on the first and third arguments. 
We ignore the second because providing a cogent answer would take 
us much too far from the central focus of our research and because the 
academic literature on the issue, while quite thin, is generally support 
ive of Bartik©s position. 10 In the case of the first argument, the literature
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is massive but still inconclusive; in the case of the third, the literature is 
small and contradictory.
ISSUE 1: CAN INCENTIVES REASONABLY BE EXPECTED 
TO INFLUENCE BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS?
It should be obvious that to claim any benefits from economic devel 
opment policy we must be reasonably sure that it works that incen 
tives can reasonably be expected to influence the investment behavior 
of expanding and relocating firms. From a theoretical perspective, 
taxes and incentives are a locationally variable business cost, and thus, 
at the margin, will influence location and investment decisions. At the 
same time, the costs of locally supplied labor are about 14 times state 
and local business tax costs, and regional variations in construction, 11 
energy, and labor costs are often larger than variations in state and local 
taxes (and incentives). Small differences in labor costs can outweigh 
quite large differences in tax costs. Cornia, Testa, and Stocker found 
that "a mere 2 percent difference in wages could offset as much as 40 
percent in taxes" (1978, p. 2). Thus, some have claimed that where 
taxes and incentives do influence location decisions, it is largely as tie 
breakers between essentially similar locations (Schneider 1985).
Unfortunately, measuring the impact of taxes and incentives on 
growth is extremely complex. It is very difficult to evaluate the 
achievements of economic development policy, because it is hard to 
know what industrial investment would have occurred in its absence 
(Diamond and Spence 1983). 12 Our practicable ability to model and 
predict accurately changes to a local economy, a task necessary if we 
are to measure the precise impact of an incentive program, is quite lim 
ited. Moreover, our ability to measure cause and effect is circum 
scribed by often significant (and variable) time lags between the 
introduction of a policy instrument, spending allocations to that instru 
ment, offers to individual firms, investment decisions on the part of a 
particular firm, the actual construction of a factory by the investing 
firm, and the achievement of a normal employment level at the factory 
site. 13 Nevertheless, there is a vast literature on the economic impact of
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development incentives. Because there are a number of recent compre 
hensive reviews, we will merely provide a summary of the literature.
In the United States, five basic methods of evaluating the impact of 
incentives have been developed. Considerable work has been done 
using two of these methods. Unfortunately, the results of this research 
effort cannot be said to support any strong statements on the impact of 
incentives on firm investment and location behavior.
The Survey Technique
In a number of studies, researchers have surveyed executives to 
determine what role incentives (and other locational factors) play in a 
firm©s relocation and expansion decisions. The surveys often distin 
guish between "must have" location factors and merely "desirable" 
factors. There is evidence that the location choice of large manufactur 
ing firms tends to be based on a sequential evaluation of factors at suc 
cessively narrower spatial scales, with decisions first on a broad 
geographic region, then a state, a metropolitan area (or county), a city, 
and, finally, a plant site. Therefore, some surveys have attempted to 
distinguish the impact of incentives (and other locational factors) at 
various spatial scales (Schmenner 1982).
The advantages and disadvantages of the survey technique are well 
known (Calzonetti and Walker 1991). At their best, surveys provide 
direct information about the actual siting decisions made by execu 
tives. Also, the more complex statistical assumptions that beset econo 
metric analyses can be avoided. Unfortunately, survey researchers 
often have difficulty finding the cohort of individuals within a corpora 
tion who were responsible for a particular location decision. Moreover, 
executives may have a direct interest in saying that incentives were 
important even if they were not admitting that an incentive had little 
effect in one©s location decision might cause later political problems  
although, given the findings of the literature, this problem may have 
been exaggerated. Finally, while surveys may rank the importance of 
various locational factors, they do not provide a precise measure of the 
impact of each locational factor on local growth. In fact, the results 
from the survey-based literature are unclear, with some research indi 
cating incentives are indeed important to location decisions (Premus 
1982; Walker and Greenstreet 1989; Calzonetti and Walker 1991;
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Rubin 1991), and other work indicating the opposite (Morgan 1964; 
Stafford 1974; Schmenner 1982). 14
The Case Study Technique
Other researchers have taken a different tack and, using variations 
on the case study method, have evaluated the impact of specific eco 
nomic development programs. The advantage of this method is that the 
work has covered a variety of different incentive instruments, from 
enterprise zones, research parks, and property tax abatements to export 
promotion schemes. Unfortunately, there are also major problems with 
this approach. In the first place, incentive programs are often very 
small relative to the local economy in which they operate. Thus, even 
where subsidies are effective, measuring their impact on a local econ 
omy is rendered difficult by economic white noise, by the other local 
factors that influence growth. Moreover, impact evaluations need to 
establish some sort of comparative control economy in order to mea 
sure precisely the effect of incentives. In the best of all worlds, the con 
trol economy would be identical to the economy receiving the 
incentive except that the control would not receive the incentive, but 
choosing a control is itself fraught with practical methodological and 
political difficulties. Unsurprisingly, given the range of programs cov 
ered, the published research using the single program approach is as 
contradictory, in terms of both detailed method and results, as the sur 
vey-based literature. 15 However, even work focusing on broadly similar 
types of programs shows discrepant results. For instance, in a recent 
widely quoted volume on enterprise zones, one study found clear evi 
dence of impact success (Rubin 1991), while studies reported in two 
other papers found little or none (Elling and Sheldon 1991; Grasso and 
Crosse 1991).
The Econometric Technique
A third strategy has been to use econometric techniques to measure 
the impact of incentives on state and local growth. At the outset it 
should be noted that, although the econometric literature is large, 
nearly all published models concern taxes. There is very little work on 
non-tax incentives, and most of this research focuses on infrastructure
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programs. 16 Moreover, of the tax models, very few have data on local 
abatements or on the various tax credits commonly in use at the state 
level. Most merely use effective tax rates (ETRs) 17 as the exogenous 
(independent) tax and incentive variable within the location equation. 
For reasons we discuss in Chapter 3, we doubt very much that tradi 
tional ETR measures provide an accurate depiction of the tax liability 
faced by firms. In fact, we believe the econometric literature would be 
much improved if greater use were made of more defensible measures 
of tax and incentive incidence.
Econometric models have been developed for various spatial scales 
and for a number of different state and local taxes. State and local 
growth measures have included "levels of or "changes in" indicators 
such as employment, gross state product, per-capita personal income, 
number of new plant openings, and small-firm birth rates. The models 
also range widely in their technical sophistication, from simple regres 
sions with poorly specified locality growth variables and with no treat 
ment of time lags in the growth variable or of endogeneity in the 
explanatory variables, to considerably more complex models that 
address most, if not all, of these issues. Almost all develop equations 
that use variables such as local labor costs, transportation costs, energy 
costs, infrastructure provision, and tax costs to explain (predict) local 
growth.
Since impressive reviews of this literature have been published 
recently, we will not repeat that work. Nevertheless, a number of points 
should be noted. No definite conclusions can be reached on the basis of 
the published research. Even the reviews seem to disagree about the 
impact of (tax) incentives on economic growth. Eisinger (1988), in an 
admittedly partial assessment of both the econometric and survey evi 
dence, suggests that the majority of work still indicates that state and 
local taxes have little or no influence on economic growth. Neverthe 
less, also in 1988, Newman and Sullivan, in a much more involved 
review, wrote, "The most recent studies, employing more detailed data 
sets and more refined econometric techniques, have generated results 
which cast some doubt on the received conclusion that tax effects are 
generally negligible" (Newman and Sullivan 1988, p. 232). Bartik, in 
what is probably the most comprehensive assessment of recent
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research to date, takes Newman and Sullivan©s conclusions a step fur 
ther:
The most important conclusion ... is that most recent business 
location studies have found some evidence of significant negative 
effects of state and local taxes on regional business growth. The 
findings of recent studies differ from those in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and early and mid-1970s, which generally did not find statistically 
significant and negative effects of taxes on state and local growth. 
(Bartik 199 Ib, pp. 38-39)
The reason for this change is that the newer work is technically more 
sophisticated and thus better able to describe the relationship between 
incentives and growth.
However, there have been other dissenting voices. In a review of 
Bartik©s summary of the literature, McGuire (1992), who has herself 
produced important work indicating that taxes do influence growth 
(Wasylenko and McGuire 1985), argues that Bartik claims too much. 
In particular, McGuire is concerned that some studies that did find a 
significant effect of state taxes on job growth have not been replicable 
and are not robust to changes in specification or time period. 18 She 
argues that the recent literature is as contradictory and inconclusive as 
the earlier literature. Our own sense is that there is a pressing need in 
econometric studies for a better measure of state and local tax and 
incentive policy. Underlying all of the econometric literature is the 
assumption that firms select locations so as to maximize their income. 
Thus, taxes and incentives should not be evaluated from the point of 
view of government receipts or spending but from the point of view 
of the firm©s income. We provide such a firm-oriented measure later in 
this book.
The General Equilibrium Technique
A fourth and quite recent strategy has been to use applied general 
equilibrium models to measure the impact of tax policy, for example, 
on the location of economic activity (Morgan, Mutti, and Partridge 
1990). General equilibrium models have an advantage over economet 
ric models in that they specify the structural relationships, and thus 
interactions, between the economic variables in the model. Unfortu 
nately, the work in this area is still too new to draw definite conclusions 
about the impact of taxes on local growth.
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The Hypothetical Firm Technique
Given the difficulties of drawing any solid conclusions based on the 
existing literature, a few researchers have opted for an entirely differ 
ent approach to the problem of taxes, incentives, and growth. This 
solution involves looking at the impact local taxes and incentives have 
on a firm©s actual income. In order to accomplish this, researchers 
build models that replicate the operating ratios, balance sheets, income, 
and tax statements of real (or, at least, potentially real) firms; this tech 
nique is sometimes called the "hypothetical firm," or "representative 
firm," method. It allows researchers to calculate exactly what impact a 
state©s or city©s taxes would have on a firm©s income. Almost all of the 
work in this tradition has looked at comparative tax burdens. 19 Very lit 
tle research has used hypothetical firm results within an explicit eco 
nomic development framework. Bartik et al. (1987) analyzed the 
location of the General Motors Saturn plant. Using realistic simula 
tions of transportation, labor, and tax costs, they calculated that the 
best location for the new plant would be Nashville, Tennessee, about 
30 miles from Spring Hill, the actual site chosen by the company. 
However, as yet, no hypothetical firm models have explicitly incorpo 
rated economic development incentives such as grants, loans, and 
training awards. 20 All current models remain essentially tools for calcu 
lating comparative tax burdens.
Hypothetical firm models, because they focus directly on the 
income effects of taxes, have tended to show that state and local taxes 
can and do have an important influence on the returns on investment of 
the firm. Few studies, on the other hand, have directly compared the 
impact of spatial variation in taxes with spatial variation in, for exam 
ple, the costs of labor, transportation, or infrastructure. Those that have 
appear to suggest that in some circumstances taxes (and other incen 
tives) may have a major impact on the profitability of various invest 
ment locations (Bartik et al. 1987; Peters and Fisher 1996).
We will not pursue the hypothetical firm literature here, since most 
of the rest of the book is taken up with our extension of the hypotheti 
cal firm technique to include most major economic development incen 
tives. However, a few points are worth noting right away. There is 
increasing policy interest in using the hypothetical firm approach to 
look at the relationship between incentives and growth. Recently, a
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number of states (and quasi-government organizations) have commis 
sioned hypothetical firm studies (Brooks et al. 1986; Laughlin 1993; 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1995). 21 We believe part of the rea 
son for this movement is disappointment that the other techniques, 
those that are generally much simpler to implement, have failed to pro 
vide clear prescriptive answers on the question of taxes and growth. 
Another factor is that recent developments in computer technology 
have made hypothetical firm models much easier to build. Finally, 
there also is the misguided belief that the hypothetical firm technique 
does not suffer from the ambiguities (particularly the statistical ambi 
guities) that beset the other methods, that the effect of two competing 
states© tax regimes on a firm©s income can indeed be calculated 
directly.
In a few cases, the results of hypothetical firm studies have been 
included in econometric analyses of the relationship between taxes and 
growth (or, at least, taxes and investment). Industry-specific measures 
of the burden of taxes deriving from the hypothetical firm model 
replace ETRs as one of the dependent variables in the econometric 
equation (Steinnes 1984; L. Papke 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Ken- 
drick 1995; Tannenwald 1996). Obviously, none of these studies was 
able to include non-tax incentives. Nevertheless, we believe that in 
general this is the right way to measure taxes (and incentives) within 
econometric models of the impact of state and local policy on growth.
Conclusions: How We Propose to Deal with the Incentive Question
Leaving aside work in the hypothetical firm tradition, solid conclu 
sions about the broad impact of business incentives on the locational 
decisions of firms cannot be drawn from the existing academic litera 
ture. As it now stands, the published research is contradictory on many 
of the most important issues. Although we are inclined to believe that 
taxes and incentives have major impacts on some locational decisions, 
we are also bound to admit that the scholarly literature again exclud 
ing research in the hypothetical firm tradition does not necessarily 
support or contradict our position.
Part of the confusion in the literature is a consequence of the way in 
which taxes and incentives have been assessed. This appears to be par 
ticularly true for the econometric studies that have relied on averaged
20 State and Local Incentive Competition for New Investment
tax measures (in other words, ETRs) or simple tax rates as the "incen 
tive." As noted, very few econometric (or other) studies have taken the 
results of detailed tax impact models as their "incentive measure," 
although it is clear that doing so would provide a vastly more accurate 
picture of the influence of taxes and incentives on firm investment and 
location behavior. A major move forward in the econometric literature 
would seem to be unlikely without first having a rigorous implementa 
tion of the hypothetical firm technique to cover both taxes and non-tax 
economic development incentives. We believe that our work with the 
hypothetical firm method, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, provides such 
a step. The incorporation of the results of this model may give future 
researchers a much more accurate picture of taxes and incentives, and 
thus could bring about a more reliable measure of the impact of taxes 
and incentives on location decisions. 22
ISSUE 2: THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCENTIVES
The second issue we consider refers to Bartik©s minimum require 
ment that state and local incentive programs must meet if they, taken 
together, have the potential to produce net national benefits. It is the 
requirement that the spatial pattern of incentives offered by states and 
localities does not run counter to the need to promote the redistribution 
of jobs from places with lower unemployment to places with higher 
unemployment. In practical terms, if state and local incentives do pro 
duce national net benefits, we should expect, at the very least, that 
places with higher unemployment would offer greater incentives than 
places with lower unemployment. As indicated earlier, from the 
national perspective the point of redistributing employment (even the 
identical number of jobs paying identical wages) from places of low 
unemployment to places of high unemployment is to exploit the differ 
ential between offered wages and reservation wages. Most of this book 
contains our empirical evaluation of the spatial distribution of incen 
tives. We now turn to the extant literature on this distribution. We look 
at the research in some detail because it has not been recently 
reviewed.
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Do poorer places provide more in the way of incentives? It is rea 
sonable to assume that the states and municipalities with the highest 
unemployment face the greatest political pressure to create jobs, and 
thus one might expect them to offer the largest incentives. On the other 
hand, high unemployment and slow job growth are likely to coincide 
with state and local fiscal distress, a declining tax base, and a reduced 
capacity to support new expenditure initiatives (Guskind 1990). Fur 
thermore, many of these programs are tax expenditures and thus escape 
scrutiny during the annual budget process; once enacted, during a 
recession perhaps, they will tend to persist long after their political, no 
less economic, rationale has disappeared. Indeed, Hanson (1993) found 
that there is considerable long-term inertia in state-level economic 
development policy-making. Also, it is hard to imagine a state official 
who would not believe that having more jobs is always a good thing. 
Given the tendency of states to imitate one another and their fear of 
appearing antibusiness by not having a decent menu of financial 
inducements to offer prospective businesses,23 there is every reason to 
suppose that economic development incentives will become quite 
widespread and may end up bearing little or no relationship to state and 
local economic conditions.
The empirical work on this question is sketchy and contradictory. At 
the broadest level, Fosler (1988) has claimed that, historically, states 
experiencing economic distress have tended to be the ones adopting 
new economic development instruments and institutionalizing the eco 
nomic development process. According to Eisinger (1988), the expan 
sion in economic development incentives in the Northeast and 
Midwest during the 1970s and 1980s was a direct result of deindustri- 
alization in those regions. At the local level, Fainstein (1991) has 
argued that the administrative switch from regulating growth (with 
zoning and other growth management instruments) to promoting 
growth (through incentives) was a direct result of economic restructur 
ing in the United States. All three writers have supported these claims 
with simple historical data showing policy adoption following eco 
nomic decline.
It is true that, in a number of states, severe economic decline did 
prompt the development of new and powerful instruments. For exam 
ple, the combined impact of severe employment loss in Iowa©s biggest 
manufacturing sector and the farm crisis provided the political impetus
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for the development, in the mid 1980s, of the state©s flagship economic 
development program, the Community Economic Betterment Account 
(CEBA). It is also true, however, that this program continues today, at a 
time when Iowa©s unemployment rate is between 2 and 3 percentage 
points below the national average.
Clarke©s (1986) more detailed study of state governments, con 
ducted for the National Governors© Association, suggests that reces 
sion and industrial restructuring, and the gubernatorial initiatives they 
trigger, are important catalysts for expansion of the state economic 
development effort. Of recent statistical analyses undertaken, Lugar 
(1987) developed models predicting state economic development pol 
icy adoption in eight categories (plus a summary category). He found 
that "overall state effort in industrial development is associated with 
lower wages and higher unemployment" (p. 47). Gray and Lowery 
(1990) ran regressions on the adoption of 43 state-level economic 
development instruments (and on two subsets of these 43). According 
to their results, the level of economic distress (measured by 1982 per- 
capita manufacturing income and by the 1983 unemployment rate) was 
an important motive for policy adoption.
At the city level, Clingermayer and Feiock (1990) ran separate 
regression models for five different categories of economic develop 
ment instruments: industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), Urban Develop 
ment Action Grants, abatements, national advertising, and business 
assistance centers. Their economic need variables (measured by city 
per-capita personal income and the city bond rating) were positively 
related to policy adoption in all five policy categories. On the other 
hand, the local development of pro-growth coalitions and various local 
institutional arrangements, such as a mayor-council form of govern 
ment, accounted for far more of the adoption of highly visible eco 
nomic development instruments than did the level of local economic 
distress. Green and Fleischman (1991) compared policy adoption by 
central cities, suburbs, and nonmetropolitan communities. They found 
that in suburban communities the 1980 poverty rate was positively and 
significantly related to the development effort, but this was not the case 
in central cities or nonmetropolitan communities. However, their other 
"economic need" measures the percentage of the population minority 
and the percentage of jobs in manufacturing were not statistically 
significant in any of the models they developed.
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Other studies broadly support these results. Bowman (1987), Rubin 
and Rubin (1987), and Feiock and Clingermayer (1986) found that 
more distressed localities tended to use a wider set of economic 
development tools or to spend more on incentives. 24 For economic 
development policy that targeted high technology, Atkinson (1991) 
found greater political and administrative commitment to policy instru 
ments in states that perceived economic distress.
In contrast, Grady (1987) found little correlation at the state level 
between changes in the level of economic distress and expanded use of 
economic development incentives. Hanson (1993) found that the state 
unemployment rate did not account for much variation in economic 
development policy choices in two of his four broad state policy cate 
gories. Interestingly, he found considerable policy inertia; states modi 
fied incrementally what they had already been doing. Confirming 
Brierly©s (1986) earlier work, Reese (1991) found in a study of tax 
abatements in Michigan that wealthier cities and cities with growing 
economies abated more.
Two recent pieces, which pay much more attention than do other 
studies to defining how policy expenditures vary spatially, have also 
demonstrated little positive correlation between the amount of incen 
tives offered by and the economic distress of a locality. Fisher©s (1991) 
simulation of the impact of investment and job creation tax credits, and 
of sales tax exemptions for manufacturing machinery and equipment, 
on the cost structure of two hypothetical firms found little evidence to 
suggest that the spatial pattern of incentives favored states and cities 
with high unemployment. "Competition does not appear to be perverse 
in its effects, [by] redistributing jobs away from distressed states; the 
pattern simply shows no consistent relation between a state©s economic 
distress . . . and the magnitude of the state tax incentives offered . . ." 
(Fisher 1991, p. 20). Sridhar©s (1996) study of the distribution of 
spending in the Illinois Enterprise Zone program uncovered no clear 
link between the intensity of incentives offered and the local unem 
ployment rate.
Overall, the literature is inconclusive about whether incentives are 
concentrated in more distressed localities. Four factors account for the 
inconclusiveness: 1) varying methodological approaches, with some 
researchers using broad historical analyses and others using statistical 
ones; 2) varying levels of sophistication, even within the body of statis-
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tical research; 3) model misspecification, especially the failure to 
include measures of the impact of locality competition on policy adop 
tion (Feiock 1989, p. 267),25 and 4) disparate independent and depen 
dent variables. The dependent variable issue requires special 
consideration. In other words, the problem is similar to that of the 
econometric literature on taxes, incentives, and growth. Not enough 
effort has been put into accurately measuring taxes and incentives.
MEASURING INCENTIVES AND THE STANDING OFFER
Most studies measure the economic development effort in ways that 
lack a sound theoretical basis for comparing variations in incentive lev 
els across localities. For instance, the increase in the number of pro 
grams offered by a state or locality says nothing about the increase in 
spending on those incentives. In fact, states often have incentives on 
their books that are essentially unfunded. 26 Conceivably, the size of the 
economic development staff might say a lot about the proper manage 
ment of the locality©s economic development instruments (although we 
doubt it), but it says nothing of how much money is available for subsi 
dizing individual firms. Similarly, total spending ignores the discrepan 
cies in the size of states. A $10 million program in Wisconsin shows a 
very different economic development effort than a similarly sized pro 
gram in California. Spending per capita solves this latter problem but 
raises a yet more fundamental one. If two states both spend an identical 
per-capita amount on a particular sort of economic development instru 
ment and if, in the first state, the program funds a much larger number 
of plants (again on a per-capita basis) than in the second state, then at 
least from the point of view of the firm, the second state would be 
offering a larger locational incentive than the first. Thus per-capita 
expenditure differences among localities ignore the way localities see 
fit to distribute their funds. Spending per job created or retained has 
more intuitive appeal for measuring policy concentration because it 
provides a seemingly clear (and comparative) measure of the actual 
value that the locality puts on each new or retained job. It indicates 
how much the locality is willing to give to create 50 or 100 or 200 jobs. 
This can be compared to spending on a similar number of jobs in other
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programs and other localities (the method has been used in a number of 
federal programs to indicate something of incentive costliness). Never 
theless, this approach has severe methodological problems.
Different sectors, and even different plants within the same sector, 
operate at different levels of capital intensity. Identical incentive 
expenditures per job might result in disparate levels of total invest 
ment. Moreover, per-job data are not available for many programs, 
especially those that are part of state tax codes. There are also very 
important conceptual and administrative difficulties involved in using 
jobs created or retained as an outcome measure (these are discussed in 
Chapter 3). The most important objection is that, if incentives do influ 
ence a firm©s location decision, it is only because the incentives alter 
the relative costs associated with operating at a particular site. Per-job 
incentive expenditures fail to capture this notion. Except for job train 
ing grants and loans and jobs tax credits, almost all incentives lower 
the cost of capital, not labor, so incentive dollars per job will not reflect 
the incentive amount per dollar of capital. Although there may be 
some, presumably sector- and asset-size-specific, relationship between 
the reduction in plant (establishment or operating) costs associated 
with an incentive and actual spending on the incentive (measured on a 
per-job basis), as far as we are aware no empirical test of this relation 
ship exists. We also do not believe that the empirical data for such a 
test are available.
Thus, it turns out that the answers to two of the most important 
questions facing economic development policy suffer from the same 
sort of problem. On the issue of whether taxes and incentives signifi 
cantly affect growth, almost all work has used inferior measures of 
state and local taxes and where indeed researchers have been con 
cerned with non-tax subsidies incentives. On the issue of what causes 
localities to offer higher or lower levels of incentives, the identical 
problem arises, but now in a more pronounced form, because much of 
this literature has been concerned with non-tax subsidies rather than 
taxes. No logically and empirically coherent measure of the economic 
development effort exists.
The intensity of a locality©s tax and non-tax incentive effort is best 
measured not by incentive spending per job, but by the locality©s stand 
ing incentive offer to the individual firm. The standing offer is obtained 
from the standard menu of taxes and incentives applicable to a firm
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locating at a particular site; it is the dollar value of the income deriving 
from that tax and incentive package available to the firm at that site. In 
this book, a comparison of spatial variation in the size of the standing 
offer to spatial variation in wage rates is used to assess the impact of 
taxes and incentives on firm investment and location behavior. The 
relationship between the size of this standing offer and the economic 
health (especially the unemployment rate) of the locality making the 
offer is used to assess whether economically distressed places pursue 
development policy more vigorously.
In this study, we analyze spatial variations in state and city standing 
offers and then correlate the standing offer of each state and city in our 
sample with the unemployment rates of those states and cities. We find 
that there are large differences among the standing offers of various 
states and cities. Indeed, in some cases the standing offer differences 
between two sites are larger than the labor costs differences. This sug 
gests to us that taxes and incentives may have an important impact on 
firm investment and location decisions.
With regard to the overall pattern of standing offers, we find a some 
what distressing pattern. There is little reason to believe that higher 
unemployment states and cities provide the largest standing offers. 
This suggests that the antecedent condition for Bartik©s argument that 
incentives may have net national benefits is not true: the spatial pattern 
of taxes and incentives in America is not likely to promote the redistri 
bution of jobs from places of low unemployment to places of high 
unemployment.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 covers some basic, 
albeit important, empirical issues, such as our choice of states, cities, 
incentives, and industrial sectors, and briefly describes our implemen 
tation of the hypothetical firm method. The methodological descrip 
tions in Chapter 2 are restricted to a few sets of issues crucial to 
understanding our results; a much more comprehensive discussion is in 
Chapter 3, which covers most of the questions that readers familiar 
with the hypothetical firm method will want answered. (Readers with
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less interest in these technical issues may want to pass over this chapter 
and proceed directly to Chapter 4.) The substantive focus in Chapter 3 
is on two separate sets of concerns: 1) the traditional methodology of 
hypothetical firm simulations and our extensions of this methodology 
and 2) our technique for the inclusion of non-tax incentives into the tra 
ditional hypothetical firm framework. The chapter, especially the sec 
ond part, provides a very extensive discussion of a range of quite 
practical modeling issues. The reason for this detail is that because we 
are the first to incorporate non-tax incentives comprehensively, on 
many technical issues there was no established literature to guide our 
decisions. Methodological assumptions play an important role in deter 
mining the results of hypothetical firm simulations; consequently, 
transparency of method is crucial.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we present our substantive results. Chapter 4 
looks at the menu of incentives that states and cities offer and the dif 
ferences these incentives make to a firm©s income. Chapter 5 considers 
the spatial pattern of the standing offer. It focuses on whether poorer 
places actually offer larger incentives. The conclusion, Chapter 6, sum 
marizes our findings and defines a future research agenda for economic 
development in the United States. We also discuss briefly a number of 
economic development policy issues for which our results have some 
bearing.
NOTES
1. Our interest is in competitive economic development policy, in other words, policy instru 
ments that encourage the relocation of investment within the United States. We are not concerned 
here with those economic development tools meant to increase productivity, such as industrial 
extension services, or those tools meant to promote exports or encourage entrepreneurship.
2. In a manner similar to that advocated by Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur (1984).
3. Unfortunately for policymakers, there is evidence from the survey literature that busi 
nesses often make location decisions on the basis of non-economic factors, such as a good cli 
mate. Statistical models of the growth of high-technology industries routinely include climate 
indexes, not because of the "least cost" issue of plant heating costs but because it is believed that 
high-technology engineers prefer to work in places with attributes such as sunshine (Markusen et 
al. 1986). Opportunities for good golfing were a claimed reason Scotland was the recipient of 
such a large proportion of Japanese and American high-technology inward investment during the 
1980s. There is a range of evidence that locational behavior is influenced in a manner not obvious 
from traditional location theory. For instance, geographical models of corporate growth have indi 
cated a distance-decay relationship in the establishment of branch plants. Ray (1971) found that 
American branch plants operating in Canada were much more likely to be controlled by head 
quarters in Chicago, Detroit, or New York, while those in Mexico were more likely to be con-
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trolled by headquarters in Los Angeles. Models of corporate expansion developed by Taylor 
(1975) and Watts (1980) also support the idea of limited spatial searches.
However, neither the use of non-economic factors nor the spatial restriction of search behavior 
necessarily undermines the general appropriateness of traditional location theory. Non-economic 
factors may have a clear economic impact on the availability of inputs; for instance, if an impor 
tant cohort of a firm©s employees values sunshine and other amenities highly, then the provision of 
these through appropriate location may be considered part of the employee©s competitive benefit 
package. A more general point should also be made: personal factors may enter location deci 
sions, "but to the extent that firm©s profit-maximizing location is altered by personal preferences, 
the firm will trade off profits for personal factors" (Wasylenko 1981, p. 160). With regard to the 
spatial search issue, traditional location theory can be expanded to take into account factors such 
as the costs of locational information and the friction of distance.
4. This is the central "positive" justification for economic development policy. It is true that 
there are a number of other important justifications. Kieschnick (1981, p. 26) discusses five:
  equalizing interstate tax differentials, which may serve as an inducement for a firm to select 
an alternative business location;
  serving as a wage subsidy to offset the effects of wage rigidity or labor immobility;
  lowering the costs of capital to induce greater overall capital formation, independent of loca 
tion choices;
  serving to redistribute income from labor to capital under the politically acceptable guise of 
providing development incentives; and
  serving as a "signal" to out-of-state businesses that the state has "pro-business" regulatory 
and spending policies.
5. For a statement of this argument in the context of infrastructural incentives, see Foster, 
Forkenbrock, and Pogue (1991).
6. For restatements of the zero-sum position, see Glickman and Woodward (1989) and Rubin 
and Zorn (1985). For an early discussion of the zero-sum aspect of economic development policy, 
see Rinehart and Laird (1972). Interestingly, Rinehart and Laird argue that there may be national 
benefits from state and local competition for jobs. Wolkoff (1990) believes that critics who have 
described economic development policy in zero-sum terms have tended to misuse or, at least, to 
overly simplify game theory.
7. This would be true until a locality market equilibrium were reached and all localities pro 
vided an equivalent level of incentives. At this point, the impact of incentives might be zero-sum. 
Of course, equilibrium will not be a normal condition of the market because it will always be in 
the interest of a locality to provide some new incentive to gain some short-term advantage over all 
other localities (Netzer 1991, p. 225). However, even at the equilibrium point there may be nega 
tive economic consequences for the nation through a misallocation of resources. Most obviously, 
capital subsidies would lead to excessive national capital intensity (with potentially negative con 
sequences for jobs).
The problem with this latter argument, as Netzer fully admits, is that its assumptions cannot 
be sustained: there already exist significant imperfections in the locality market; the United States 
is not a closed economy, and incentives could attract investment from other countries; jurisdic- 
tional spillover effects exist; and state and local governments already levy an inefficient system of 
taxes. Incentives do not necessarily increase these inefficiencies.
Some researchers do not put much store in the misallocation of resources argument and claim 
that insofar as various incentives work to lower the cost of capital, they induce greater overall cap 
ital formation, independent of location factors. They may therefore be "good" from the national 
perspective (Kieschnick 1981, p. 26).
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8. These are as follows: 1) jurisdictions compete for business investment by lowering their 
taxes and by providing the services needed by business; 2) there are no interjurisdictional spill 
over effects; and 3) there are sufficient jurisdictions to approximate a competitive market.
9. Underlying Bartik©s results is a theory of skill acquisition, the "hysteresis effect." Essen 
tially, migration towards places that have experienced demand-induced job shocks will take place 
over a period of time because people are not perfectly mobile. Original residents of the place 
undergoing growth will therefore receive some short-term labor market advantages: for instance, 
some residents who would otherwise not have jobs will be employed. The human capital 
resources of these workers will improve, and they will thus be better able to compete with new in- 
migrants when the latter finally arrive. Thus, a temporary labor market advantage will have 
longer-term effects.
10. Job search theory suggests that the optimal search strategy for the job seeker is to accept 
the first job offer that exceeds the seeker©s reservation wage (Zuckerman 1984). The reservation 
wage is the lowest wage at which the worker would be willing to accept a job offer and is usually 
interpreted as a measure of the benefits, psychic and otherwise, that the individual places on lei 
sure time. Bartik (1991b) argues that, on average, the local reservation wage will vary inversely 
with the local unemployment rate. The reason for this is that in low-unemployment localities, 
where obtaining a job is relatively easy, individuals who place a high value on getting a job would 
tend to find work, while those who do not clearly place a high value on their leisure time. On the 
other hand, in high-unemployment localities, where finding a job is relatively difficult, individuals 
tend to be willing to work for low wages. As indicated, this purported relationship between the 
local unemployment rate and the reservation wage is crucial for Bartik©s broader argument about 
the potential positive net national benefits of state and local incentives. It also underpins the 
research presented in this book: if incentives do tend to promote the redistribution of investment 
(and therefore jobs) to places of high unemployment, this is beneficial only to the extent that the 
benefits of employment are greater in high-unemployment localities than in low-unemployment 
localities.
Unfortunately, only one published study has looked directly at the relationship between the 
local unemployment rate and the reservation wage. This study was conducted on British data and 
found that for every 1 percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate, the average res 
ervation wage of the unemployed declined by £0.012, or 1.6 percent (Jones 1989). Sridhar (1996) 
replicated, as closely as possible, Jones©s model using U.S. data from the 1987 Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) established at the University of Michigan. Sridhar©s results generally 
accord with Jones©s: she found that for every 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate, there was a 10 cent decrease in the reservation wage. This is the first clear U.S. evidence of 
an inverse relationship between the local unemployment rate and the reservation wage of the 
unemployed.
11. These estimates are from Bartik (1991b, p. 61). As our work and that of others show (see, 
for example, Papke 1995), this number varies considerably across sectors.
12. Diamond and Spence (1983) are referring to the evaluation of British regional policy. In 
fact, many of the instruments, goals, outcomes, and problems of British and European "regional 
policy" are reflected in U.S. "economic development policy." Both have focused on promoting job 
growth within subnational regions. Very often, grants, municipal loans, and labor subsidies have 
been used to encourage relocation (or "inward investment," to use the British euphemism) of 
firms from other regions. In this book, where appropriate, we treat regional policy and economic 
development policy as essentially equivalent and make use of the regional policy literature.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some important differences between "economic 
development policy" and "regional policy." Regional policy is generally financed and directed by 
central government; for instance, Regional Selective Assistance (a major British subsidy provided
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during the 1980s) was funded and managed by the London-based Department of Trade and Indus 
try. Economic development policy in the United States is directed by, and very often financed by, 
state and local government. As a result, central control of regional competition, and thus restric 
tions on that competition, are clear with most regional policy instruments, but less so with eco 
nomic development policy.
13. This fact poses considerable problems for the administration of policy incentives as well 
as for research on policy effectiveness (Peters 1993).
14. For recent reviews of the survey literature, see Calzonetti and Walker (1991), Eisinger 
(1988), and Blair and Premus (1987).
15. Bartik (1991b) has also provided a recent review of this literature and finds that it is gener 
ally supportive of the concept that incentives influence the locational behavior of firms.
16. Recent exceptions include Goss (1994), Goss and Phillips (1994), and Spiegel and de 
Bartolome (forthcoming), all of whom looked at the impact of economic development agency 
spending in their models. As indicated in the text, the relationship between infrastructure and 
growth has been studied in some detail. See Singletary et al. (1995) for recent evidence from the 
infrastructure literature. There is also a limited amount of work that considers other incentives. 
See Loh (1995) for a very useful recent study of jobs-targeted development incentives. Marlin
(1990), for instance, has looked at the relationship between the issue of IDBs and gross state 
product. Krmenec (1990) has investigated the relationship between IDBs and employment 
growth.
17. Effective tax rates are usually calculated by dividing regional gross tax receipts (from all 
taxes or from particular taxes such as corporate income taxes) by some base, usually employment 
or population.
18. This refers to a comparison of the results in Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) to those in 
McGuire and Wasylenko (1987), Carroll and Wasylenko (1990), and Carroll and Wasylenko
(1991).
19. This literature is covered comprehensively in Chapter 3. For two recent implementations 
of this method by the scholar most closely associated with the method, see J. Papke (1995, 1996).
20. This would mean to endogenously incorporate economic development incentives into the 
financial statements of the firm.
21. A review of this literature is provided in Chapter 3.
22. Until now, hypothetical firm simulations have not included modeling of non-tax incentives 
such as grants, loans, and loan guarantees (although there has been one very limited attempt). 
Moreover, the hypothetical firm simulations have suffered from problems of spatial and sectoral 
scale. These are discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
23. Discussions of business climate surveys certainly bear this out; see Eisinger (1988) and 
Skoro(1988).
24. See also Hanson (1985), Sharp (1986), Swanstrom (1985), and Young and Mason (1983).
25. Hanson (1993) presents the most sophisticated attempt at including variables for policy 
competition between states.
26. Also, the directories on which incentive counts are based are sometimes seriously unreli 
able.
